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This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Mali and Niger to determine possible 
differences that may have influenced the path of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. Specifically, 
it seeks to determine if (1) the degree of governmental decentralization achieved after 
multiple peace agreements led to less government control in one country over the other, 
and (2) the counterinsurgency strategies applied by each country during previous 
rebellions could have led the rebels to believe Mali would be a softer target to attack than 
Niger. 
 The evidence indicates that despite an earlier start and an intense public relations 
campaign, Mali did not achieve a significantly different level of decentralization than 
Niger by 2011, removing it as a possible influence on the 2012 rebellion. Both countries 
created new community level governments charged with administering all aspects of civil 
services but lacked the revenue to operate without international assistance. The difference 
in counterinsurgency strategies between the two countries, however, is stark. Mali’s 
habitual willingness to compromise with past rebel groups contrasts greatly with Niger’s 
insistence on seeking a military solution to conflicts, giving the 2012 rebels a logical 
indication of where success would be more likely.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Nomadic Berber language-speaking Tuareg populations that span the borders of 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Algeria have generally felt marginalized by the 
central governments of all of the countries in which they reside. This perceived relative 
deprivation has led to a series of rebellions in Mali and Niger. In the 1980s, Tuareg 
received training and support from Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi, and several 
hundred even served in combat in Lebanon and Chad with his Arab Legion. Rebel units 
began to infiltrate into Mali and Niger toward the end of the 1980s and staged a rebellion 














Figure 1.  Tuareg Region (Source:  “Who are the Tuareg?,”  
http://africa.si.edu/exhibits/tuareg/who.html, accessed November 8, 2012) 
The fighting in northern Mali prompted peace talks in 1991, mediated by Algeria, 
between President Moussa Traoré of Mali and Iyad ag Ghali representing two of the rebel 
groups, the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad (MPA, or the Popular Movement of 
Azawad) and the Front Islamique et Arabe de l’Azawad (FIAA, or the Islamic and Arab 
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Front of Azawad).1 These talks produced the Tamanrasset Accord of January 1991. After 
a coup removed President Traoré from power in March 1991, another agreement, the 
Pacte National, was signed in Bamako in April 1992. This agreement was between the 
government of Mali represented by Colonel Brehima Sire Traoré and Lieutenant Colonel 
(and future president) Amadou Toumani Touré, and Zahalby auld Sidi Mohamed on 
behalf of the Tuareg Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad (MFUA, or Unified 
Movements and Fronts of the Azawad). The MFUA served as an umbrella organization 
including four different Tuareg rebel groups: the MPA, the FIAA, the Armeé 
Revolutionaire pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (ARLA, or the Revolutionary Army for 
the Liberation of Azawad), and the Front Populaire de Liberation de l’Azawad (FPLA, 
or the Popular Front of Liberation of Azawad). Sporadic fighting continued into 1995 as 
splinter groups split from the negotiating parties in an attempt to gain more concessions 
from the government before turning to peace.  
Fighting broke out in Niger between the central government led by President Ali 
Saibou and the Tuareg rebel group the Front de Liberation de l’Air et l’Azawad (FLAA, 
the Liberation Front of the Air and Azawad) in 1991. Several other rebel groups joined 
the FLAA and created the umbrella group the Coordinasion de Resistance Armeé (CRA, 
or Coordinated Armed Resistance), which negotiated for peace in 1994 and signed the 
Ouagadougou Accords with newly elected President Mahamane Ousmane. The 
Organization de Resistance Armeé (ORA, or Organization of Armed Resistance) 
continued the rebellion into 1995, when it signed an additional agreement with the state.2  
                                                 
1 Azawad is the chosen name for the Tuareg homeland; the 1992 Pacte National actually states that 
“The Government of Mali is not opposed to the name ‘Azawad’ for these regions. However, it respects the 
right of the people to decide freely on the name local territory,” Pacte National, University of Notre Dame 
Peace Accords Matrix, last viewed August 29, 2012,  
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/accords/Mali_Peace_Accord-proof.pdf;  Baz Lecocq, 
Disputed Desert:  Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali 
(Leiden:  Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010), 311. 
2 Agreement Between the Republic of Niger and the ORA, University of Notre Dame Kroc Institute 
for International Peace Studies, last viewed September 20, 2012, 
https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/accord/49; Thomas Krings, “Marginalization and Revolt among the 
Tuareg in Mali and Niger,”Geojournal 36.1 (1995), 62;  The groups covered under the CRA umbrella 
include the Front de Liberation de l’Air et de l’Azawad (FLAA), the Front de Liberation Tamoust (FLT), 
the Armée Revolutionaire de la Liberation du Nord Niger (ARLNN), and the Front Patriotique de libération 
du Sahara).  
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Peace lasted for about a decade on the basis of these agreements which promised greater 
autonomy and resource distribution.3   
Mali saw a renewed rebellion in 2006–2009 by rebels claiming that the 
government had failed to implement the peace agreements. These rebels formed the 
Alliance Democratique pour le Changement (ADC, the Democratic Alliance for Change) 
and a later splinter group that would emerge in 2007, the Alliance Tuareg Niger-Mali 
pour le Changement (ATNMC, or the Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change) led by 
Ibrahim ag Bahanga. Many rebels incorporated into the military as part of the previous 
peace negotiations defected to the insurgents with large quantities of heavy weapons and 
supplies.4  Similarly, fighting in Niger exploded in 2007 when le Mouvement des 
Nigeriéns pour la Justice (MNJ, Nigerien’s Movement for Justice) attacked a government 
position, demanding the full implementation of the 1994 peace agreement. In addition, 
the MNJ attacked foreign uranium companies and kidnapped their employees, as well as 
conducted hit-and-run attacks on the Nigerien security forces. The MNJ also drew Tuareg 
defectors from the army. In both cases, new agreements between the governments and 
rebels were reached and peace returned briefly.5 
When the revolt against Qaddafi began in 2011, he sent representatives to 
northern Mali and Niger to recruit for his army. Young men were offered up to $1000 a 
                                                 
3 Background information on the 1990s rebellions comes from Malian Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel:  The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (Carlisle:  
Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 110–115 ; “Mali:  A Timeline of Northern Conflict,” IRIN, last updated 
April 5, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95252/MALI-A-timeline-of-northern-conflict; Jibrin 
Ibrahim, “Political Exclusion,” Africa Today 41, no. 3 (1994), 15–39; Krings, “Marginalisation and Revolt 
among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger,” 57–63; Stephen A. Emerson, “Desert Insurgency:  Lessons from the 
Third Tuareg Rebellion,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no.4 (2011): 669–687. 
4 Lecocq, Disputed Desert, 392; “MALI:  Armed men seize three military basis in remote north,” 
IRIN, last accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/59096/MALI-Armed-men-seize-
three-military-bases-in-remote-north; Muna A. Abdalla, “Understanding of the Natural Resource Conflict 
Dynamics:  The Case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel,” Institute for Strategic Studies Paper 194 
(2009): 6.  
5 Niger profile, BBC News Africa, last updated June 28, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-13943662; Cordula Meyer, “Tuareg Activist Takes on French Nuclear Company,” Spiegel Online 
International, last updated February 4, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/uranium-mining-in-
niger-tuareg-activist-takes-on-french-nuclear-company-a-686774.html; Peter Gwin, “Lost Lords of the 
Sahara,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, last updated August 18, 2011, 
http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/lost-lords-shara.   
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month, homes, cars, and Libyan citizenship to serve in Qaddafi’s defense forces. 
Hundreds signed up, and after a short training session in the desert joined the thousands 
of former Tuareg rebels who had relocated to Libya after the 2006–2009 conflict.6  New 
recruits and former rebels together were then forced out of Libya when Qaddafi fell, 
returning to Mali (via a route along the Algeria / Niger border) and Niger.7  In Mali, the 
Mouvement National de Libération de L’Azawad (MNLA, National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad), was created by Ibrahim ag Bahanga, a leader of both previous 
rebellions (and former Malian army officer). Although Bahanga was killed in 
August 2011 in a car crash, the MNLA launched its fight for the independence of the 
Tuareg homeland Azawad in January 2012, heavily armed with modern weapons from 
Qaddafi’s army.8  It was joined by radical Islamic rebel groups (Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and later the Mouvement pour l’Unité et le Jihad en 
Afrique de l’Ouest [MUJAO], or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) in a 
                                                 
6 Tim Lister, “Out of a job, Gadhafi’s Tuareg fighters may create new troubles,” CNN, last updated 
September 8, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011–09–08/world/libya.tuareg_1_misrata-tuareg-fighters-
malian?_s=PM:WORLD; Boureima Hama,  “Kadhafi-recruited Tuaregs return to Niger,” Agence France 
Presse – English, last updated September 4, 2011, http://reliefweb.int/report/libya/kadhafi-recruited-
tuaregs-return-niger. 
7 Erin Foster-Bowser and Maya Moseley, “Libya’s Migration Crisis of 2011,” Civil-Military Fusion 
Center (CFC), last updated June 2012, https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Holder 
/Documents/r017%20CFC%20Monthly%20Thematic%20Report%20(29-June-12).pdf. 
8 The influence of Libyan arms and experience was compiled from news sources at the beginning of 
the latest rebellion: Andrew McGregor, “A Portable War:  Libya’s Internal Conflict Shifts to Mali,” The 
Jamestown Foundation, last updated October 28, 2011, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38583;  
Adam Nossiter,  “Qaddafi’s Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate and Insurgent Army in 
Mali,” the New York Times, last updated February 5, 2012,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-
mali.html?pagewanted=all;  “Arms, Men out of Libya Fortify Tuaregs’ Mali Rebellion,”  MSNBC, last 
updated February 10, 2012, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46340199/ns/world_news-
mideast_n_africa/t/arms-men-out-libya-fortify-tuaregs-mali-rebellion/#.T8UZ8I5BR6w; Keita, Conflict 
and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel, 28–29; Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation:  
Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 3 (2001): 515–519; 
Yahia H. Zoubir, “Qaddafi’s Spawn:  What the Dictator’s Demise Unleashed in the Middle East,”  Foreign 
Affairs, last updated July 24, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137796/yahia-h-zoubir/qaddafis-
spawn?page=show.  
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marriage of convenience.9 In response to the rapid success of the rebels, several junior 
Malian officers with support from soldiers angered by the president’s handling of the 
rebellion launched a coup d’état on March 22, 2012. The coup disrupted the entire chain 
of command and caused the U.S. and France to suspend military assistance programs. 
The MNLA then rapidly took control of all of northern Mali and declared the 
independence of Azawad on April 6, 2012.  
In contrast, no rebellion was launched in Niger. As early as September 2011, the 
government in Niamey estimated that approximately 150,000–200,000 people had 
entered Niger from Libya, many of them ethnic Tuareg who had fought in the Libyan 
Army.10 Several academic focus groups and international media outlets estimate that 
hundreds of Tuareg fighters returned to Niger in that mass of displaced persons, and that 
some of the members of the MNLA in Mali are actually Nigerien Tuareg.11 Given that 
the 1990–1995 and 2006–2009 rebellions were against the governments of both Mali and 
                                                 
9 Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbor:  Algeria and the Conflict in Mali,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, last accessed November 4 2012, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/22/paranoid-neighbor-algeria-and-conflict-in-mali/e4kt; Damien 
McElroy, “Timbuktu Islamists cut man’s hand off,” The Daily Telegraph, last updated April 5, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9189282/Islamist-commander-
cuts-off-vandals-hand-in-Timbuktu.html; David Zounmenou, “The Sahel:  Is there a Solution to the Tuareg 
Insurgency in Mali?” last updated March 20, 2012, http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1450. 
10 Scott Stearns, “Niger Says Libyan Instability Undermines Security, Economy,” Voice of America, 
last updated September 16, 2011, http://www.voanews.com/content/niger-says-libyan-instability-
undermines-security-economy-129946878/145306.html; Tim Lister, “Out of a job, Gadhafi’s Tuareg 
fighters may create new troubles,” CNN, last updated September 8, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011–09–
08/world/libya.tuareg_1_misrata-tuareg-fighters-malian/2?_s=PM:WORLD. 
11 Hama, “Kadhafi-recruited Tuaregs return to Niger;” Nathan Kennedy, “Niger:  Getting it Right?” 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Tufts University, last updated April 19, 2012, 
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2012/04/19/niger-getting-it-right/; Celeste Hicks, “Africa:  Tuareg Rebellion 
Could Spark Violence in Mali, Niger, and Southern Nigeria,” AllAfrica News, last updated March 15, 
2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201203151079.html; Andrew McGregor, “What the Tuareg Do After the 
Fall of Qaddafi Will Determine the Security Future of the Sahel,” The Jamestown Foundation, last updated 
September 16, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38408; 
Alex Thurston, “Qaddafi’s African mercenaries head home. Will they destabilize the Sahel?” Christian 
Science Monitor, last updated August 30, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-
Monitor/2011/0830/Qaddafi-s-African-mercenaries-head-home.-Will-they-destabilize-the-Sahel.. 
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Niger, and that Niger shares a border with Libya while Mali does not, why did the 2012 
uprising happen in Mali only (at least to date)?12 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will contribute to the collection of knowledge on rebellion in the trans-
Sahel region. This is important to U.S. policy due to the destabilizing effect such 
rebellions have in the region, and the possible safe-havens outside of state control the 
insurgents may provide to terrorists. The temporary agreement between the secular 
MNLA and Islamist groups Ansar Dine and MUJAO to join forces in northern Mali at 
the beginning of the rebellion provides a basis for such concern, as does the 
marginalization of the MNLA by the Islamist organizations since then. Ansar Dine, with 
the stated goal of imposing Islamic Law throughout Mali, has committed attacks on Sufi 
shrines in Timbuktu and elsewhere, and is a known associate of AQIM. Al Qaeda’s 
relationship with Ansar Dine and the MUJAO could allow the terrorist organization to 
expand their operations in the region, which has been the center of their kidnapping 
business for several years. Niger and Mali are also members of U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM)’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), including Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which seeks to “enhance cooperation among 
the region’s security forces.”13  Understanding the threats they face is key to 
accomplishing this mission. More generally, the U.S. Department of State’s 2010 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) emphasizes the need to 
                                                 
12 Lansana Gberie, “Is Democracy Under Threat in West Africa? Coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, 
democratic defence in Senegal,” African Renewal Online, last updated September 11, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2012/democracy-under-threat-west-africa; Marine 
Olivesi, “African Migrants Caught in Libyan Conflict Rebuilding Lives in Mali,” PRI’s The World, last 
updated May 2, 2012, http://www.theworld.org/2012/05/mali-migrants/; Paul Rogers, “Monthly Global 
Security Briefing,” ReliefWeb, last updated July 2, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/risk-intervention; 
William Lloyd-George, “Africa: ‘Everything I have worked for was lost’: Thousands of refugees have been 
driven out of Mali by former Libyan mercenaries,” The Guardian, last updated April 1, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/29/mali-refugees-painful-people-begging. 
13 United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, last 
accessed May 26, 2012, http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp. 
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“promote stability and security in conflict-affected and fragile states”14 and the U.S. 
government’s commitment “to preventing and resolving crises and conflicts of many 
kinds–interstate wars and aggression, coups, insurgencies.”15 This research also builds a 
foundation for addressing these broader U.S. policy goals.16 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The extensive body of literature on rebellion in general and in Africa specifically 
cannot account for the events in Mali and Niger in 2012. The leading theories indicate 
that the risk of the Libyan conflict spreading to Niger was similar or higher than the risk 
to Mali. There is overwhelming agreement among academics that rebellions, revolutions, 
and civil wars in one state tend to adversely affect their neighbors.17  The assumption that 
civil wars are a domestic affair is largely discredited; furthermore, there is often a 
“regional clustering”18 of civil wars. Selhyan summarizes this trend by saying “the 
                                                 
14 U.S. Department of State, The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): 
Leading Through Civilian Power, 2010 (Washington, DC:  GPO, 1965), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153142.pdf, 42. 
15 Ibid., 121. 
16 “Tuareg, Islamists Join Forces to Run North Mali,” France 24, last updated  May 27, 2012, 
http://www.france24.com/en/20120527-tuareg-islamists-join-forces-run-north-mali;  The Guardian, “Mali 
Tuaregs and Islamist Rebels to Merge and Create New State,”  May 27, 2012,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/27/mali-rebel-groups-new-state; Anne Look, “Mali Rebels 
Merge, Plan to Create Islamic State,” Voice of America, last updated May 27, 2012, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/mali-rebels-group-merge-plan-to-create-islamic-state/1105876.html; 
Tiemoko Diallo and Adama Diarra, “Mali Islamists Attack UNESCO Holy Site in Timbuktu,”  Reuters, 
last updated May 5, 2012, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE84405O20120505; Michael 
Lambert and Jason Warner, “Who is Ansar Dine?” Global Public Square, CNN World, last updated August 
14, 2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/14/who-are-ansar-dine/. 
17 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,  “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” 
International Organizations 60, no. 2 (2006):  335; Halvard Buhaug, “Contagion or Confusion?  Why 
Conflicts Cluster in Space,” International Studies Quarterly 52 (2008):  215–220; Benjamin A. Most and 
Harvey Starr,  “Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War,”  The American Political 
Science Review 74, no. 4 (1980):  932–946; Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr,  “Opportunity, 
Willingness, and the Diffusion of War,”  The American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (1990):  47–67; 
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,  “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,”  Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 3 
(2007):  293–309; Ivo H. Daalder, “Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia,”  The International 
Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown,  Cambridge:  Center for Science and International 
Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1996): 36–39; David A. Lake and 
Donald Rothchild, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement:  The International Spread and Management of 
Ethnic Conflict (La Jolla:  Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1996), 21–23. 
18 Salehyan,  “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” 335. 
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regularity and strength of geographical clustering casts doubt on the conventional 
assumption that civil wars are independent, domestic phenomena, driven exclusively by 
processes and attributes within the state where conflict occurs.”19  Two states that share a 
border are more likely to experience a spread of conflict from one state to the other. 
Finally, in line with the geographic relevance of neighboring states, many scholars agree 
that the spatial grouping of conflict can be explained due to the presence of the same 
actors and issues across the state boundaries. This would indicate that the conflict in 
Libya and return of Tuareg fighters should have induced conflict only in Niger, as it 
borders Libya and Mali does not.20 
Scholars also emphasize the role and importance of ethnicity in the spread of civil 
conflict across borders, not as a cause, but as a facilitator.21  Ethnic groups that span state 
borders, like the Tuareg, are likely to influence each other to mobilize and engage their 
respective governments in violent acts, making the risk of civil war contagion higher 
when the same ethnic group is found on both sides of the international boundary. 
Gleditsch summarizes this theory arguing that “transnational linkages may be particularly 
relevant in cases where disadvantaged ethnic groups are already mobilized in another 
country and can count on the support of ruling ethnic kin in other states or mobilize 
among refugees in neighboring states”22 While not a completely homogeneous body, the 
Tuareg of Mali and Niger fit this description. Like the theory of the tendency for conflicts 
to infect neighboring countries, the argument of the spread of ethnic conflict across state 
boundaries cannot explain the conflict contagion from Libya to Mali and the absence of it 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 336. 
20 Buhaug, “Contagion or Confusion?” 215–220; Most,  “Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and 
the Spread of War,” 932–946; Siverson, “Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War,” 47–67; 
Salehyan,  “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” 335–366; Gleditsch,  “Transnational Dimensions of 
Civil War,” 293–309. 
21 Lake, Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement, 5–7; Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil 
War,” 297–298; Buhaug, “Contagion or Confusion?,” 216,221. 
22 Ibid., 215–233; Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” 306. 
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from Libya or Mali to Niger. Since the literature on the international nature of conflict 
contagion cannot explain the situation in Mali and Niger, what about internal 
explanations?   
There are two schools of thought on internal causes and/or facilitators of 
rebellion. Both are situated within rational choice theory, but identify different 
motivators:  greed vs. grievance. Collier and Hoeffler bluntly state that “war occurs if the 
incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the costs.”23  Klare argues that 
resources like oil and water are the key drivers in modern conflict.24 Snyder and 
Bhavnani note that “recent studies of contemporary civil war have found a strong and 
positive relationship between lootable wealth and conflict…Easy-to-procure resources… 
‘breed’ civil war by supplying the means and motive for armed conflict.”25  Boas and 
Dunn suggest that resources do not cause conflicts, but can cause them to escalate, noting 
that “in both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the integration 
of extraction and marketing of natural resources to the conflicts occurred only once the 
conflicts were well under way.”26  The greed theory, however, does not explain the 
situation in Mali and Niger. Niger has significant resources (uranium), while Mali does 
not:  the flight from Libya should have exploded into rebellion in Niger, not Mali.27   
The second and older school of thought maintains that conflicts are caused by 
economic and political marginalization. Studies by MacCulloch indicate that populations 
                                                 
23 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 
(1998): 563.  
24 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars:  The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York:  Owl 
Books, Henry Holt & Company, LLC, 2002). 
25 Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, “Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes:  A Revenue-Centered 
Framework for Explaining Political Order.”  The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (2005):  563–564; 
Klare, Resource Wars:  The New Landscape of Global Conflict.   
26 Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn, “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?”  
African Guerrillas:  Raging Against the Machine (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007), 10–11. 
27 Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity.”  The Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 
6 (2000): 839–842; Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil 
Wars,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005): 319–321; Benedikt Korf, “Rethinking the 
Greed-Grievance Nexus:  Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka,” The Journal of 
Peace Research 42, no.2 (2005): 201–203.    
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are more likely to revolt when inequality in the nation is high, and that increasing the 
disparity in income also increases preference to seek change through revolution.28  
Buhaug suggests that marginalized groups on the periphery of large countries are 
expected to resort to insurgency, and that “when all else fails, aggrieved groups of society 
often resort to violence to redress their grievance—either by seeking to overthrow the 
ruling government or by attempting to secede.”29  Ibrahim contends that disenfranchised 
groups resort to violence when they perceive that they are not receiving what they believe 
to be rightfully theirs, whether that is political, economic, or commercial.30  Like greed 
theories, grievance theories cannot explain the outcomes in Mali and Niger. Economic 
and commercial grievances among the Tuareg in Niger are either equal to or higher than 
in Mali, so these theories also suggest that Niger should have experienced a rebellion 
along with or instead of Mali.  
The literature on the impact of decentralization on conflict might account for the 
divergent outcomes in Mali and Niger. Findings on this question are split more or less 
evenly. Brancati, analyzing the impact of decentralization policies in 30 developing 
democracies from 1985 to 2000 finds that it “is a useful mechanism in reducing both 
ethnic conflict and secessionism.”31 In a study of Mali, Seely contends that 
decentralization helps to legitimize the national government, consolidate political power, 
and co-opt separatist movements.32  Tordoff argues that centralized states are inherently 
inefficient, and that decentralized governance with well-trained personnel increases 
public participation in governance and alleviates grievances. The other side argues that 
decentralization does not necessarily improve governance or prevent conflict. Ryan 
argues that democracy in Costa Rica has been undermined by decentralization, due to the 
                                                 
28 Robert MacCulloch, “Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution,” Journal of Law and 
Economics 48, no.1 (2005):  93, 114. 
29 Halvard Buhuag, “Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War.” Journal of Peace 
Research 43, no.6 (2006): 691. 
30 Ibrahim, “Political Exclusion, Democratization and Dynamics of Ethnicity in Niger,”  35–36.  
31 Dawn Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict 
and Secessionism?”  International Organization 60, no. 3 (2006):  681. 
32 Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation,” 503–505. 
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perceived illegitimacy and corruption of municipal leadership. Falleti finds that in many 
cases real power is not actually transferred to the governors and mayors, leaving them 
dependent on the national government for resources, making decentralization more 
apparent than real and thus not affecting conflict risk.   Siegle and O’Mahony, studying 
the situations in Colombia, the Philippines, Ghana, and Uganda assert decentralization 
decreases risks of civil conflict only where the central government can project security 
and where there is no large concentration of minority groups. They go on to suggest that 
“loosening central control triggers an inevitable sequence of ever greater demands for 
autonomy, ratcheting up the centrifugal pressures on the state. Rather than building a 
stronger sense of ownership and affinity with the state, decentralized authority 
accentuates differences between regions.”33 This literature on the negative outcomes of 
decentralization points out that failure is usually a product of poor implementation. Thus, 
this literature suggests that (a) greater decentralization decreases the risk of conflict, or 
(b) decentralization increases the likelihood of conflict, or (c) decentralization has no 
impact on conflict. This thesis will investigate whether (a) or (b) can explain the 
 
 
divergence of Mali and Niger in 2012:  (a) did greater decentralization in Mali lead to 
higher risk of conflict or (b) did greater decentralization in Niger lead to lower risk of 
conflict?34 
The final relevant literature deals with how counterinsurgency strategy affects 
conflict recurrence. The conventional wisdom is that heavily military counterinsurgency 
strategies are associated with an increased risk of conflict recurrence, and that negotiated 
                                                 
33 Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony, “Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict 
Mitigation Strategy.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, last updated September 1, 2006, 
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/Decentralization-as-a-Conflict-Mitigation-
Strategy.pdf,1. 
34 Ibid., 62; Tor A. Benjaminsen,  “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the 
African Sahel?  The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 6 
(2008):  819–821; William Tordoff, “Decentralization:  Comparative Experience in Commonwealth 
Africa.”  The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no.4 (1994):  555–580; Jeffrey J. Ryan, 
“Decentralization and Democratic Instability:  The Case of Costa Rica,” Public Administration Review 64, 
no. 1 (2004): 81–84; Tulia G. Falleti, “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization:  Latin American Cases in 
Comparative Perspective,” The American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 343. 
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settlements are found to provide a more durable solution than military resolutions.35  This 
study does not necessarily challenge those findings; however, it explores whether an 
overly compromising negotiation strategy increases or decreases the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence in a situation where the government cannot deliver on promises made during 
negotiations. Niger’s military counterinsurgency strategy may have made civil war less 
likely in 2012. Mali was far more willing than Niger to limit the use of violence and insist 
on negotiations, yet the latest rebellion chose northern Mali as their objective. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesis of this study is that the historic strategies adopted by Mali in 
response to Tuareg rebellions had the unintended consequence of making Mali a softer 
target than Niger for the 2012 rebels. The thesis examines two potentially explanatory 
aspects of those strategies. First, Mali embarked on a decentralization program early in 
the 1990s rebellion, which may have reduced the level of state control of Tuareg areas 
compared to that exercised in Niger. Second, greater emphasis on negotiations, 
reconciliation, and compromise in previous counterinsurgency strategies in Mali 
compared to Niger may have given the Tuareg forces pushed out of Libya in 2012 
confidence that the government in Bamako would attempt to negotiate, giving them time 
to gain ground and consolidate their presence in the region. Thus, the hypothesized 
independent variables are:  (1) the extent of decentralization in each country, and (2) the 
relative balance of negotiations and military action in previous counterinsurgency 
strategies.  
                                                 
35 R. Scott Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, last accessed November 
21, 2012, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf, 7, 14–16; J. Michael Quinn, 
T. David Mason and Mehmet Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace:  Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” 
International Interactions:  Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 33:2 (2007), 
167, 173–174, 176; Achim Wennmann, “Renewed Armed Conflict in Georgia?  Options for Peace Policy 
in a New Phase of Conflict Resolution,” PSIO Occasional Paper no. 3 (2006), 59–61; Karl R. DeRouen 
and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Peace Research 41 
(2004), 304.    
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A most similar system design (MSSD) will be utilized in this thesis. In addition to 
the similarities in the Tuareg regions already discussed, Mali and Niger are both poor 
former French colonies (both gained independence in 1960), 80–90% of their populations 
are Muslim, and they both transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s. Mali and Niger 
each have populations estimated at approximately 16 million, administratively and 
politically divided into eight regions. Each country had free and fairly elected presidents 
when Tuareg forces were pushed out of Libya. Both the Forces Armées du Mali (FAM, 
Mali Armed Forces) and the Forces Armées Nigeriennes (FAN, Niger Armed Forces) 
maintain 6000 - 7000 soldiers in their ground forces with similar equipment, and both 
receive military assistance from France as well as the United States through the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP, formerly the Pan Sahel Initiative, then the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative). Both countries have experienced interruptions 
to foreign aid and international military support due to coups d’état, with Mali 
experiencing two since 1990 and Niger three.36  
This thesis uses archival research and secondary sources to determine each 
country’s level of decentralization at the start of the 2012 rebellion and potential links to 
divergent rebellion experiences thereafter. The analysis will then determine the balance 
between negotiation and force in each country’s previous counterinsurgency strategies, 
and potential links to divergent rebellion experiences in 2012. The research will next 
focus on the period between the downfall of Qaddafi in the fall of 2011 and the MNLA 
declaration of independence in April 2012 for direct evidence of linkages between these 
independent variables and the dependent variable (rebellion). If Mali is found to have 
been significantly more or less decentralized than Niger at the end of 2011, the thesis will 
look for links between greater or lesser decentralization and recurrence of conflict. If 
 
 
                                                 
36 CIA World Factbook, based on 2012 data unless otherwise notated, last accessed November 21, 
2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html; IHS Jane’s Defense and 
Security Intelligence & Analysis, last accessed November 20, 2012, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Grid.aspx. 
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Mali is found to have used significantly more or less force against insurgency in the past, 
the thesis will look for links between that counterinsurgency mix and recurrence of 
conflict. 
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II. DECENTRALIZATION AND CONFLICT RECURRENCE 
This chapter investigates the potential of governmental decentralization to explain 
the 2012 rebellion. Both governments committed themselves to decentralization in the 
agreements that ended the rebellions of the 1990s and the 2000s. Did one deliver on these 
promises significantly more than the other?  And if so, what was the impact on the 
recurrence of rebellion (or its absence)?  One conducting research on the decentralization 
efforts in both Mali and Niger finds the bulk of it is oriented towards the success of Mali, 
and that while not without some severe challenges to implementation, the population of 
Mali has embraced decentralization whole-heartedly, and the country sets the example for 
all of their neighbors in West Africa.37  Moreover, there is a greater amount of 
information available on Mali’s decentralization progress as compared with Niger. 
Combined with Mali’s dedicated project to inform the public of the decentralization 
process and Niger’s belated initiation of their own devolution of public administration to 
the local level (with studies in the early 2000s suggesting Niger was not even attempting 
to decentralize38), one can easily get the impression that Mali was more successful in the 
process. This chapter evaluates the decentralization progress of both countries up to the 
end of 2011 to see if such a difference indeed occurs.39  
                                                 
37 Robert Pringle, “Mali’s Unlikely Democracy,” The Wilson Quarterly 30, 2 (2006), 31–37; Kalifa 
Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel:  The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 9:3 (1998), 115–119; Robert Pringle, “Democratization in Mali:  Putting History to Work,” 
United States Institute for Peace Peaceworks no. 58 (2006), 43–47; Cheibane Coulibaly, “Decentralization 
in Mali: a constrained responsibility transfer process,” (2010), 2–4; with regards to educational 
administration, Donald R. Winkler and Alec Ian Gershberg, “Education Decentralization in Africa:  A 
Review of Recent Policy and Practice,” (2003), 23; Abdou Togola and Dan Gerber, “An Evaluation of 
Malian Civil Society’s Role in Governance,” Open Society Institute for Africa Governance Monitoring & 
Advocacy Project (2007), 2–6, 8,9. 
38 Carolyin Norris, “Mali-Niger:  Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, 
WriteNet Paper no. 14 (2001), 2, 12–16. 
39 Thea Hilhorst, “Local governance institutions for sustainable natural resource management in Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and Niger,” Royal Tropical Institute KIT Working Paper Series (2008), 12–14. 
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A. MALI 
The 1991 Tamanrasset Accord and the 1992 Pacte National initiated a decade 
long decentralization process. The government also launched a dedicated campaign to 
inform the public of the details and progress of the Pacte National. Both the newly 
elected president of Mali, Alpha Konaré, and a burgeoning civil society diligently spread 
the word of peace and reconciliation as well as the details of the peace agreement.40  The 
Council of Ministers adopted an ordinance in 1991 that created the northern region of 
Kidal (increasing the number of administrative regions to eight) and 703 urban and rural 
communes nation-wide.41  This produced a four-tier political system:  communes at the 
lowest level, cercles above them, regions above the cercles, and the central state at the 
top. The communes elect their own leadership, who send representatives to the next 
higher levels. However, decentralization really began only in 1999, when local elections 
finally took place and the central government completed the hand-over of the 
administration of land, transportation, education, and health care to elected local 
governments.42   
True decentralization did not occur as intended in either of the peace agreements 
due to financial reasons; furthermore, the handover of responsibility was not 
accompanied by a handover of funds. The poor financial support to the local level 
governments, in turn, indicates that no matter how many community government entities 
were created, they did not have the funding to execute their duties. Under the 
development tax law, “communes get 80 percent of this revenue, circles [sic] get 
15 percent, and regions get five percent…local governments are forbidden to keep their 
                                                 
40 Robert B. Charlick, “Popular Participation and Local Governmental Reform,” Public 
Administration and Development 21 (2001): 151; “Briefing:  War and Peace- Mali Repeats the Cycle,” 
IRIN, last updated March 29, 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95186/Briefing-War-and-peace-Mali-
repeats-the-cycle; Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel, 17; Robert Pringle, “Mali’s Unlikely 
Democracy,” The Wilson Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2006), 32, 34. 
41 “Mali Kidal Region created; price of gas reduced,” BBC Monitoring Service, last updated May 16, 
1991; Hamidou Magassa and Stefan Meyer, “The Impact of Aid Policies on Domestic Democratisation 
Processes:  The Case of Mali,” Donor Harmonisation:  Between Effectiveness and Democratisation, Case 
Study IV (2008): 16.  
42 Seely, “A political analysis of decentralization,” 499–500; Charlick, “Popular Participation and 
Local Government Reform,” 151; Pringle, “Mali’s Unlikely Democracy,” 35. 
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own money but must give it back to the central treasury and then rely on central 
government accounting agents and disbursements”43 effectively removing the financial 
management aspect from the hands of the commune leaders. Reports describe how the 
development taxes merely cover the day-to-day operations of the local governments, and 
that any additional projects will push the communes over budget. A report from USAID 
summarized the situation by stating: 
Mali clearly undertook a meaningful political decentralization process by 
establishing the elected sub-national governments (collectivités 
décentralisées or collectivités locales), but beyond the formal fact of 
political decentralization, the achievements are much less clear. Fiscal 
decentralization has lagged (as responsibilities have been transferred 
without accompanying resources) and administrative decentralization 
retains a significant role for the state’s exercise of its “supervisory 
capacity.”44 
Overall, by the early 2000s, Mali formally decentralized governance, but relied heavily 
on donor countries and NGOs to implement the changes established in the Pacte 








                                                 
43 Robert Pringle, “Democratization in Mali:  Putting History to Work,” United States Institute of 
Peace Peaceworks No. 58 (2006):  43–44. 
44 Chéibane Coulibaly, J. Tyler Dickovick, and James T. Thomson, “Comparative Assessment of 
Decentralization in Africa:  Mali In-Country Assessment Report,” USAID (2010), 3. 
45 Freedom in the World 2002:  Mali, Freedom House, last accessed August 29, 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/mali; Freedom in the World 2005:  Mali, 
Freedom House, last accessed August 29, 2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2005/mali; Karl DeRoen Jr., Mark J. Ferguson, Samuel Norton, Young Hwan Park, Jenna Lea & 
Ashley Streat-Bartlett, “Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity,”  The Journal of 
Peace Research 47(3) (2010): 341; Kelsey Jones-Casey, Ailey Kaiser Hughs, and Anna Knox, “Lesson 2:  
The Challenge of Decentralization in Mali,” Focus on Land in Africa Brief, Landesa World Resources 
Institute (2011):  4. 
 18 
monetary support to the local governments dampens the effects of the efforts to 
decentralize, as will be indicated in assessments by financial institutions later in this 
study.46 
The 2006 rebel leaders listed the slow implementation of decentralization in Mali 
as one of their reasons for reneging on their end of the peace treaties and returning to 
violence. In the negotiations to end that rebellion, the government committed itself to 
strengthening the decentralization process in already in place. They convinced the rebels 
that more could be done to implement the promises of the Pacte National; that somehow 
the government would focus more funding to the local level to assist in their operations. 
The situation remained unchanged for the most part, as the government had decentralized 
as far as it would prior to the 2012 rebellion with the earlier creation of the 703 
communes.47    
In 2003 the World Bank determined Mali’s level of decentralization to be 1.75 out 
of 4.0 due to the lack of central government support to the new community governments. 
Using similar criteria, the German bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) in 2011 
gave Mali a score of 3.0 out of 4.0 for political decentralization, a 2.75 for administrative 
decentralization, and above 3.0 scores for the areas of stability and local accountability. 
The only low score was a 2.0 for accountability and support at the central government 
level.48 On the eve of the 2012 rebellion, Mali’s decentralization efforts succeeded in 
                                                 
46 Elisabeth Molteberg, “Linking Relief and Long-Term Development Activities in NGO Projects of 
the SSE Programme in Mali, Eritrea and Ethiopia,” The SSE Program (1997):  33–34; Keita, Conflict and 
Conflict Resolution in the Sahel, 24–25. Keita lists the following as providers of donor assistance to 
reconstruction and infrastructure improvement:  Algeria, Belgium, Canada, the European Union (EU), 
France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, the United States (U.S.), the African Development Bank, 
the Islamic Development Bank, and various United Nations agencies; Freedom in the World 2005:  Mali;  
Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat, “Mali: The Tuareg - Between Armed Uprising and Drought” AllAfrica, 
February 28 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201202281157.html; Charlick, “Popular Participation and 
Local Government Reform,” 152; Molteberg, “Linking Relief and Long-Term Development Activities,” 
33–34; Ole Martin Gaasholt, “State Decentralization and Local Politics in Mali,” Cadernos de Estudos 
Africanos, 5/6 (2003): 83–84. 
47 “Mali: Government Strikes New Peace Deal With Tuareg Rebels,” IRIN, last updated July 5, 2006, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/59566/MALI-Government-strikes-new-peace-deal-with-Tuareg-rebels. 
48 Klaus Veigel, “Constructing Indicators to Measure and Monitor Decentralization in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” Annual Meeting of the Informal Development Partners Working Group on Decentralisation and 
Local Governance (DPWG-LGD) (2011):  6–7. 
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establishing the promised community level organizations. The only major challenges 
were in financing these institutions. The question then becomes:  did Niger decentralize 
to a similar level?  
B. NIGER 
Niger implemented a decentralization plan similar to Mali in the decade after 
1995. Military coups d’état in 1996 and again in 1999 delayed progress on the devolution 
of authority to local levels because the international aid required to implement the 
decentralization plan was either suspended by the donor countries or held up by the 
disruptions in the central government. True decentralization in Niger did not begin until 
2004. The National Assembly originally started deliberations on a decentralization bill in 
1998, but it was not passed until 2002 due to the government upheaval surrounding the 
violent removal of President Mainassara. However, newly elected President Tandja was 
sworn in by the end of the year, and during his inaugural address he vowed to continue to 
implement the Ouagadougou Accords and to give a new impulse to decentralization.49  
The bill created 265 new communes to inherit the decentralized administrative authority. 
Niger finally held nationwide local elections in 2004. The 3700 newly-elected mayors 
and councilors were charged with creating a local infrastructure development plan, 
livestock management and assistance, collecting taxes, and coordinating with NGOs. As 
in Mali, local communities inherited responsibilities without funding, and thus relied on 
international aid and NGOs to provide assistance. The central government provided 







                                                 
49 “President Mamadou delivers inaugural speech.” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. last accessed 
November 17, 2012, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
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assistance picked up from there. Also like Mali, a major factor in Niger’s failure to 
adequately resource its decentralized governmental institutions was lack of state 
capability. 50   
As in Mali, leaders of the 2007–2009 uprising listed the slow pace of 
decentralization as one of their main reasons for launching another rebellion. In their 
eyes, the government failed to deliver on its earlier promises. The MNJ’s first statements 
to the public after launching attacks on Nigerien army positions in May 2007 referred to 
political neglect and a lack of jobs, schools, and drinking water, all of which were now 
the (unfunded) responsibility of the local level governments. Rebel leaders only signed 
another truce with the government in 2009 after President Tandja promised a renewed 
emphasis on decentralization. Like Mali, however, once the central government 
completed the structural changes by creating hundreds of new municipalities earlier in the 
decade, it had decentralized as far as it would prior to the 2011 collapse of Libya.51 
The World Bank gave Niger a score of 1.0 out of 4 in 2003, describing the 
situation as “nominal to no decentralization,”52 due to the lack of funding to local 
government. The score is also lower than Mali’s, indicating that Niger established less 
                                                 
50 Freedom in the World 2006:  Niger, Freedom House, last accessed August 29, 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/niger; Thea Hilhorst and Irene Guijt, 
“Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation:  A Process to Support Governance and Empowerment at the 
Local Level,” Koninklijk Instituut Voor de Tropen (Royal Tropical Institute)(2006), 25; “Tuareg Ex-
Combatants to Get Promised Assistance a Decade After Peace Accord” UN Integrated Regional 
Information Networks, Africa News, last updated October 14, 2005; Norris, “Mali-Niger:  Fragile 
Stability,” 13; Carlo Koos and Matthias Basedau, “Does Uranium Mining Increase Civil Conflict Risk?  
Evidence from a Spatiotemporal Analysis of Africa from 1945 to 2010,” GIGA Research Programme 
Working Papers:  Violence and Security No. 205 (2012): 22; Peace Accords Matrix:  Agreement Between 
the Republic of Niger and the ORA; “Niger; U.S. Commends Niger On Recent Elections.” Africa News, 
last accessed November 17, 2012, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic; Matovu, “Issues Related to 
Developing Requisite Capacities,” 5; John Uniack Davis, “Niger Gets Back on Track,” Journal of 
Democracy 12, No. 3 (2001): 80–87; “Niger:  Country Receives $50 Million for Reforms in the Rural And 
Social Sectors,” AllAfrica News, last updated June 13, 2006, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200606140002.html. 
51 “‘New rebel’ group emerges in Niger,” BBC Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, last updated May 18, 2007 www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic; “Niger: 
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Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, last updated April 12, 2009, 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
52 Ndegwa, “Decentralization in Africa,” 12. 
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representational bodies for its population at the local level. However, Niger held elections 
for its new municipal councils in 2004 and established the High Commission for 
Administrative Reform and Decentralisation (HCRAD) in 2005 to monitor 
decentralization. As a result, the 2011 KfW study gives Niger a political decentralization 
score of 2.8 out of 4.0, an administrative score of 2.25, and fiscal decentralization score 
of 1.67, only slightly lower than Mali. Thus, the level of decentralization cannot explain 
the divergent outcomes of 2012 because it was essentially the same.53   
C. CONCLUSION 
In both Mali and Niger, decentralization occurred to comparable levels by the end 
of 2011 and the return of Tuareg fighters to both countries from Libya. Both countries 
created local government institutions and elected representatives to them. Both countries 
also transferred the responsibilities of managing health care, education, water and land 
management, and tourism to these communal bodies. Finally, both promised to 
decentralize government revenue but instead turned to international donors for funding 
local government. Regardless of Mali’s creation of more village-level elements, the 
financial constraints in both countries limited the effects of decentralization. The 
differences that do exist in the level of decentralization between Mali and Niger are not 
great enough to have an effect on the events of 2012. 
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III. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY AND CONFLICT 
RECURRENCE 
This chapter focuses on the counterinsurgency strategies employed by both Mali 
and Niger in the 1990–1995 and 2006–2007 rebellions to determine if their strategies 
varied significantly, and if this variation can explain the events of 2012. The first part of 
the chapter finds that Malian policy was consistently to negotiate early, and that Nigerien 
policy was to fight first and negotiate as a last resort. The second part of the chapter looks 
for indications that this affected the calculations of armed Tuareg fleeing into both 
countries from Libya in 2012. 
A. MALIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The government adopted a strategy of negotiations with the rebels early in the 
1990 uprising after a brief period of armed confrontations. The rebellion, launched in 
June 1990, was followed by government negotiations within months to set the stage for a 
peace agreement.54  President Traoré signed the Tamanrasset Accord in 1991 with the 
MPA and FIAA less than a year after the onset of insurgency, committing to an 
immediate ceasefire. The Pacte National of 1992 also provided for a withdrawal of the 
majority of the Malian armed forces from the north and the establishment of a 
decentralized security program with the delegation of law enforcement control to the 
local and regional governments.55  The only parts of the agreement that actually took 
place in relation to security were the withdrawal of the Malian army from the region to 
fewer and fewer posts in the cities of Kidal, Menaka, and Gao, and a small amount of 
Tuareg integration into the military. Fighting continued, however, for several years. 
Negotiations secured peace agreements with certain elements within the rebels, while 
separate and often nameless splinter groups continued to establish domains in northern 
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Mali, gaining territory by taking advantage of the government’s reluctance to fight and 
attacking other Tuareg rebels and the occasional Malian army patrol that would venture 
outside of their garrisons. The government established that it would continue to negotiate 
with any groups that were not satisfied with the peace agreements.56 
In the 2006 rebellion, President Amadou Toumani Touré (otherwise known as 
ATT) sought a diplomatic settlement with the insurgents. His first response was to avoid 
any bellicose rhetoric and attempt to prevent any reprisals against non-rebel Tuareg. He 
told reporters in 2006:  “I am a soldier of peace. My role is not to pour oil on the 
fire…Mali must give a good example in its management of this crisis”57 and that “[those] 
who today attacked the military base in Kidal must not be mistaken with our other 
Tamashek and other compatriots who live with us with our same problems, who have 
chosen Mali, who have chosen loyalty, and who have the same rights as us.”58  The 
Malian government continued a soft approach to the conflict and sought out moderate 
Tuareg leaders, (many of whom were disgusted by some of the rebel factions’ 
indiscriminate use of violence) for attempts at mediation. Barely two months after the 
first attacks on the army barracks in Kidal, Menaka, and Tessalit, ATT announced the 
launch of an economic development program for northern Mali valued at approximately 
$21 million and supported by the European Union.59   
The government organized a peace summit in Algiers that same year, resulting in 
the Algiers Accord, where it continued to make more concessions to the rebels showing 
that it would rather give things to them than fight, actually encouraging more Tuareg 
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demands. This included more local empowerment (further decentralization) and 
economic development (refocusing foreign aid, improvements to roads, water systems, 
and other infrastructure), social and cultural development of the northern region of Kidal 
as well as for the integration of the Tuareg rebels into the Malian army, just like in the 
Pacte National. Moreover, the Algiers Accord included even further withdrawal of the 
Malian army from the north.60  There is no available information on the internal thought 
process of the rebel groups, however, the consistent government compromise to Tuareg 
demands following violence surely did nothing to make rebellion less attractive. While 
attempting to assuage Tuareg grievances, this conciliatory approach gave the Tuareg 
leadership the impression that Touré would rather give in to their demands than fight.61   
Bahanga’s breakaway group the ATNMC continued to attack, demanding more 
from the government. Mali sustained attempts for a negotiated resolution to the conflict 
by conducting another round of peace talks in 2009, this time involving the ATNMC and 
moderated by the African Union (AU) president at the time, Muammar Qaddafi, in Libya. 
This continued the tradition of avoiding violence, making concessions, and 
unintentionally creating an environment that would be advantageous to the future return 
of rebels in 2012. The government of Mali continued to offer to the Tuareg insurgents 
more local empowerment, economic development, and further integration into the armed 
forces, including the formation of an antiterrorism unit made up of former combatants 
and again, a general scaling-back of government security forces in northern Mali.62  The 
demilitarization once more confined government troops to bases in Timbuktu, Gao, and 
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Kidal.63 Many residing in Bamako were critical of the President’s willingness to 
negotiate. An editorial in Mali’s national daily newspaper The Independent voiced 
widespread public discontent with the government counterinsurgency strategy of 
avoiding fighting and conducting negotiations when it said “[t]hese measures will 
encourage every region of Mali to organize their own rebellion.”64  Negotiation did not 
lead to rebellion across the country, but it did set the stage for the next revolt in 2012.65 
B. NIGERIEN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The Nigerien government attempted to crush the 1990s rebellion militarily 
undertaking negotiations only after several years of military operations failed to bring it 
to heel. Thus, Niger’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign continued for years after Mali 
initiated negotiations with its rebels. Niger demonstrated its intent to ruthlessly put down 
the revolt; at the first sign of unrest among the Tuareg population, the military conducted 
a major operation in which approximately 400 Tuareg were reportedly rounded-up and 
executed in the town of Tchin Tabaraden. When media organizations made this 
information public, the government held a hasty investigation and detained several army 
officers, who were subsequently released under pressure from the military.66  In 1992, as 
Mali was finalizing the details of the Pacte National, Niger decreed “a security 
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precaution zone”67 in the Tuareg homelands, listing state security as a reason to broaden 
the authority of the military forces in the region. After four years of an exclusively 
military response, the government brokered a peace agreement with the various rebel 
groups. Cracks were beginning to show in the state security apparatus, with numerous 
mutinies in the army over unpaid salaries. Financially drained, the government saw no 
other choice but to negotiate.68 
This did not constitute a shift in strategy, however. When insurgency returned in 
2007, the government again employed a strictly military response. Referring to the rebels 
as bandits and drug traffickers, President Tandja refused any negotiation whatsoever until 
the rebels lay down their arms. Tandja justified his refusal to negotiate by claiming that 
the government had implemented the 1995 Ouagadougou Accords fully, and thus there 
was no legitimate reason for a rebellion. He redirected $60 million to support military 
operations and deployed 4000 troops into the northern region in July 2007. The 
Economist reported on September 13, 2007 that the “entire north has been turned into a 
battle zone, with army checkpoints and both sides laying landmines…”69 The governor of 
Agadez province, Abba Boukar, restricted travel to military convoys only in the areas 
affected by the rebellion and imposed a curfew in the regional capital. On August 24 
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President Tandja declared a state of emergency for the entire region of Agadez. This 
allowed the government to make dozens of detentions and arrests as well as evict the 
press from the region (for the duration of the counterinsurgency), blacking out any 
reports of escalating violence. He also claimed that the MNJ was laying landmines in 
Niamey, calling for to form “peoples’ brigades”70 to find and denounce those suspected 
of conducting actions against the government. In a lesson to future rebels, the army 
forcefully relocated about 4000 people from a city they considered to be a center of 
gravity for the insurgents, Iferouane. This moved 80% of its population to areas south of 
Agadez to deny the rebels safe haven and support. This military strategy continued for 
two years, with heavy losses on both sides.71 
The government included severe restrictions against the media as a part of its 
counterinsurgency strategy, providing another indication that the regime was only 
interested in crushing the rebellion, no matter what the cost. This is in contrast to Mali, 
where the free press continued to flourish in spite of the rebellion. Niger’s freedom of the 
press status according to Freedom House was degraded from “Partly Free” to “Not Free” 
due to the government’s eviction of reporters from the conflict zone, and the suspension 
of several media outlets that attempted to cover the conflict.72  The government also 
banned the broadcasting of Radio France International due to the accusation that the radio 
station was biased towards the MNJ cause. Journalists, foreign and domestic, were 
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threatened with arrest and prosecution for merely covering the conflict, no matter how 
impartial. Many correspondents were jailed for publishing reports on the government’s 
handling of the insurgency. Tadja’s media blackout would last throughout the 
counterinsurgency, preventing an international audience from observing his military 
operations against the Tuareg rebels.73  
Tanja reluctantly entered negotiations with the rebels after this scorched earth 
policy resulted in a military stalemate. Most rebel fighters agreed to join the peace 
negotiations in recognition of this military stalemate. As in the previous decades, only 
after a military solution had failed did Niger undertake negotiations, ultimately offering 
concessions similar to the ones Mali had negotiated years earlier.74   
C. STRATEGIC DECISIONS OF REBEL LEADERS IN 2012 
Consistent with past action against security threats in Mali, the government chose 
not to confront the possibility of another rebel uprising following the collapse of 
Muammar Qaddafi’s government in 2011. Little was done to intercept and screen the 
flow of refugees from Libya for weapons and military equipment. This would be a 
difficult task regardless of the government’s intent due to the porous nature of the 
borders, but no attempt was made to seize incoming weapons, despite warnings from 
several government officials in the region. This would contrast greatly with Niger, 
showing almost an indifferent attitude from the government of Mali in even attempting to 
prevent a rebellion militarily. The two countries had similar levels of competence and 
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equipment within the armed forces at the time, but employed them differently in the face 
of another Tuareg rebel threat.75 
The general population in southern Mali recognized the recurring government 
strategy of negotiations with rebels and voiced opposition. After the attacks against 
garrisoned Malian troops began in January 2012, President Touré called for general calm 
in a televised address and directed Malians to avoid confusing the insurgents with the rest 
of the Tuareg population as he had done in 2006.  “Those who attacked military barracks 
and other locations in the north must not be conflated with our other compatriots – 
Tuareg, Arab, Songhai, Peul – who live with us.”76  The National Assembly called for a 
forum for peace and reconciliation with the Tuareg rebel leaders within a couple of weeks 
of the initiation of hostilities. Thousands violently protested the government’s soft 
approach to the conflict, assembling in Bamako.77 ATT met with disgruntled spouses of 
soldiers, who condemned the “softness of government toward the Tuareg offensive.”78  
Even after the MNLA and associated Islamist groups conducted several successful 
attacks in January 2012, the government repeated its commitment to dialogue and 
negotiated settlement. These attacks included the summary execution of at least 70 
soldiers and civilians in the town of Aguelhok on January 14. The decision of several 
junior officers to depose ATT through a coup d’état sealed the fate of northern Mali by 
disrupting the unity of command from the President to the ground commanders and 
prompting the United States and France to suspend security assistance programs. 
Ironically, the coup leaders, whose justification was that ATT was too soft on the 
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insurgency, called for peace talks with the rebels soon after taking power and prior to the 
MNLA declaration of independence on April 6.79 
While there have been no indications that Tuareg rebels planned on launching a 
rebellion in Niger, the governments pre-emptive actions showed that they would continue 
the tradition of military responses to threats. Niger’s military confronted the hundreds of 
thousands of Tuareg fleeing Libya, among them former fighters from his army destined 
for both Niger and Mali. President Issoufou appears to have carried on the strategies of a 
strong response to threats; furthermore, coupled with the knowledge of historical 
responses from the government and military, any potential rebel groups entering Niger 
could reasonably assume they were in for a fight. Issoufou acted decisively by ensuring 
that his security forces check returning refugees for weapons and other military hardware 
that could be used in a rebellion.80  The military increased patrols in the north, disarming 
ex-fighters discovered entering the country from Libya (with the support of U.S. 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a part of the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism 
Partnership).81  As early as August 2011, the military seized approximately 60 vehicles 
and a dismantled helicopter smuggled out of Libya, influencing the security forces to 
begin conducting their own aerial patrols along the northern border.82  There were also 
several incidents of the Nigerien army clashing with heavily armed Tuareg entering the 
country after the fall of Qaddafi. In one instance the military ambushed a convoy of 
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heavily armed vehicles entering Niger from Libya, killing 13 and taking 13 prisoners. 
The army seized 36 assault rifles, 11 machine guns, three rockets and 11,000 rounds of 
ammunition, not to mention the 4x4 vehicles carrying them.83  There have also been 
several instances of groups of Tuareg fighters surrendering to authorities upon return to 
Niger, with several dozen turning themselves in to police in April 2011. The Nigerien 
security forces continued to intercept Tuareg entering Niger as the fighting raged in 
northern Mali, to include capturing a former MNJ leader, Aghali Alambo, who had been 
a close aid to Qaddafi after fleeing Niger in 2009.   Although his intent was unknown, 
Alambo was stopped in Niger with an undisclosed amount of explosives and weapons in 
March of 2012.84 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that Mali has consistently negotiated with rebels, 
taking only defensive military action to prevent the conflict from spreading south. Both 
President Konaré and Touré were convinced that giving in to the rebels’ demands would 
be easier than fighting. Their actions signaled to later rebels that Mali was a soft target, a 
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message that was reinforced as Touré offered reconciliation as soon as the 2012 rebellion 
began. In contrast, Niger has consistently pursued the military options first, only 
negotiating in the face of military stalemate. This signaled to later rebels that they could 
not expect quick or easy gains in Niger. This message was also reinforced as Issoufou 
responded proactively and militarily to the expulsion of armed Tuareg from Libya in 
2011. Since the success of the rebels in Mali, he has been the leading advocate of a 
military solution to the Mali crisis by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). He directed his security forces to screen the returning Tuareg for weapons 
and military equipment. At the same time, the Issofou Administration called for the other 
West African heads of state to recognize the security problems caused by the collapse of 
Libya, and campaigned for a regional solution to the crisis. The difference in historical 
counterinsurgency strategies between Mali and Niger are stark, and contributed to rebels’ 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis tested two hypotheses. The first was that variations in governmental 
decentralization, resulting from earlier peace agreements, made one country a more 
attractive target than the other. Since both Mali and Niger are poor and can provide little 
for their respective communes, the hypothesis was that more decentralization in one of 
the countries led to less central government involvement in the areas in question, making 
it an easier target for a rebel uprising. The evidence examined leads me to reject this 
hypothesis. While literature on decentralization in general is largely ambivalent with 
cases made for both its positive and negative effects on conflicts, there is a dearth of 
information on the decentralization efforts in Niger. With the exception of scoring 
provided by international financial institutions, the majority of research was conducted 
prior to Niger’s efforts in 2004, falsely concluding that the country would not devolve 
administrative authority. Combined with Mali’s highly publicized decentralization 
efforts, this gives the impression that Mali was more successful in its efforts; nonetheless, 
decentralization levels as of 2011 are virtually identical. Both decentralized 
administrative responsibilities to the local level, creating new regional and local 
governments. However, neither has significantly decentralized revenue allocations. 
Donations and support from the international community do not go beyond supporting 
the daily operations of local governments. Mali has a slightly better decentralization 
score due to the creation of more governmental subunits, but the difference between the 
two countries is negligible and cannot explain the events of 2012. 
The second hypothesis is that variations in counterinsurgency strategy made Mali 
appear to be a softer target in 2012 than Niger. The evidence suggests that  
counterinsurgency strategies in the two countries do indeed differ markedly. Mali’s 
policy of accommodating rebels rather than fighting contrasts greatly with Niger’s 
strategy of punishing insurgents into a military stalemate. This makes Mali the logical 
choice for a Tuareg rebel group on the run from Libya and looking for a place to establish 
an area of operations. It could expect that the government would seek negotiations, 
allowing it to establish a foothold. It could also expect that Niger would fight first and 
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talk later. While force is not the solution to recurring insurgency, it may be a critical 
element in deterring future conflict. This does not challenge the findings of the majority 
of research that suggests that negotiation and reconciliation are the ideal way to prevent 
conflict recurrence; it complements it. Both measures are required. The government 
cannot immediately cave in to insurgent attacks and push for negotiations; this rewards 
the rebels’ violent behavior as seen in the case of Mali, leading to conflict recurrence. 
However, dialogue is necessary to conclude hostilities. Ideally the government would 
only conduct negotiations from a position of strength, after the insurgents have been 
defeated militarily.   
The conclusions on counterinsurgency strategy and conflict recurrence established 
in this thesis can contribute to resolving the current situation in Mali and the U.S. policy 
towards the region. With the international community’s increasing interest in poorly 
governed and even ungoverned spaces like northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern 
Algeria due to the threat of the consolidation of extremist groups AQIM and their 
affiliates, the problem of northern Mali requires a military solution. There are several 
reasons why it is important to extend military power throughout the borders of the 
country, and as will be discussed later in this conclusion, this will require (at least 
initially) the participation of other regional security forces. These ungoverned spaces 
have been utilized as caravan routes since ancient times, and more recently have become 
the preferred path for smugglers in drugs, weapons, people, and other contraband from 
South America and Africa into Europe. Focusing on drug trafficking, the shift in demand 
from North America to Europe, with some studies estimating a 50 percent drop in the 
United States and Canada versus a doubling or tripling in European demand,85 has led to 
a corresponding shift in the transportation methods of the illicit goods. European law 
enforcement agencies have dramatically increased their surveillance of passengers as well 
as incoming airfreight coming directly from South America, causing the traffickers to 
search for alternate routes. The lack of government authority along the ancient trade 
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routes through countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger provide a cheap medium to 
move these goods into the markets in Europe.86       
The trafficking of drugs and other contraband through countries like Mali is not in 
of itself degrading the security of the region; rather, it is the second- and third-order 
effects of governmental corruption and the generation of funds for extremist groups that 
the smuggling contributes to that is damaging. This, therefore, must be addressed with 
military force as part of a counterinsurgency campaign. The traffickers use bribes to 
secure free passage through the region, compromising the integrity of security officials 
who become accustomed to looking the other way and allowing for the freedom of 
maneuver of non-state actors. This security challenge increases dramatically when the 
smugglers either align with or become part of the extremist groups in the region. AQIM 
is known more for criminal activity in West Africa than for Islamic ideology, specializing 
in kidnapping for ransom as well as involvement in black market trafficking. Ibrahim ag 
Bahanga’s Tuareg rebel groups like the ATNMC have also likely been involved in the 
drug trade, negotiating with Mali’s central government for more autonomy in order to 
continue smuggling operations.87  Furthermore, Mali’s tradition of negotiations instead of 
military force created the situation of lawlessness in the northern region, allowing 
extremist and criminal organizations to operate with impunity while making a profit. 
This, in turn, has led to the region becoming a safe haven for Islamic extremists in 
general, and must be addressed with military force.88             
Imposing a military counterinsurgency strategy in northern Mali will by no means 
be an easy task, and will require time and patience for all involved due to the complex 
nature of the situation. This strategy must take action against the current insurgency as 
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well as any future illegal smuggling operations that affect the region. First of all, the 
Malian army must be reestablished and rebuilt; a large amount of vehicles, weapons, and 
other equipment was seized by the Tuareg rebels and Islamic extremist groups when the 
army withdrew and the northern half of Mali collapsed. Besides the weapons and 
equipment lost on the battlefield, the insurgents captured key weapons depots where the 
troops were garrisoned in cities like Gao, adding to an already lethal stockpile of 
weapons carried from Libya the previous year.89  These armaments and vehicles must be 
replaced, but countries that have provided military assistance in the past (the United 
States and France) should look beyond the normal focus of only developing units at the 
tactical level. Previous assistance has emphasized improving the capabilities of frontline 
troops at primarily the battalion and company level, and has paid little attention to the 
structural and institutional framework of the entire army, to include training, logistics, 
and administration, as well as better integration into a whole-government approach to 
solving the problem.90  Once a civilian government is established in Bamako without 
interference from the March 2012 coup leaders, and the U.S. and France can reassume 
assistance, efforts should focus on building an organization that can eventually sustain 
and administer itself, as well as instill the values and ethos common in professional 
militaries through a structured training system. These are long-term goals will take 
several years, at a minimum, to make an impact.   For more immediate effects, 
international assistance can help the Malian armed forces by supporting operational 
intelligence.91      
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Since the Malian army is incapable of conducting offensive operations 
unilaterally due to the events of the past year, regional forces will be required to defeat 
the insurgency militarily. The problems faced by Mali span the borders of several 
countries in the region, to include Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. The 
Tuareg rebels, Islamic extremists, and illicit traffickers (who, include both rebels and 
extremists) pay little heed to international borders; moreover, a regional military solution 
is appropriate. The leadership at ECOWAS is aware of this. Draft plans from the regional 
community include a 180 day period to assemble and prepare a force of approximately 
3300 West African soldiers in addition to the Malian army to secure northern Mali, but 
no date has been set to accomplish this.92  There are several challenges inherent with this 
plan. First of all, it does not include Algeria, who is not a member of ECOWAS. Algeria 
possesses one of the most powerful armies in the region, which as been fighting the same 
types of insurgents for decades. Any real military strategy for the region would require 
the assistance of Algeria, but the government in Algiers is reluctant to get involved, 
concerned that it could reignite violence within its own borders. Under diplomatic 
pressure from France and the U.S., Algeria recently stated that it would not oppose a 
military intervention, but would not support one, either.93  Another obstacle to a military 
solution is that like most countries in the region, the population is largely hostile to 
foreign intervention in their homeland, and would be reluctant to support it. Even troops 
under a UN and ECOWAS mandate would meet hostility from the populace. Protests 
against an outside intervention have occurred sporadically over the last several months.94 
Solving this lack of popular support requires a delicate information campaign from the 
government of Mali. All attempts should be made to portray the coalition as being led by 
the Malian army, with a guaranteed withdrawal of foreign troops once conditions are met. 
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Another group that is vehemently opposed to foreign intervention are the Tuareg 
themselves, and their support is vital to the counterinsurgency and establishment of 
security in northern Mali. This does not run contrary to the findings of this thesis; the 
central government can gain the support of the Tuareg rebels without conducting lengthy 
negotiations and making concessions to them. Securing the assistance of the Tuareg 
(rebels and the general Tuareg population) will be necessary to establishing security as 
even a force of the size being proposed will likely only be able to secure the major cities 
in the region, like Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The region is simply too large to cover with 
the projected manpower. Gaining the support of the rebels to fight the extremists and 
secure northern Mali would have been a dubious proposition in the initial months of the 
insurgency; however, infighting among the various insurgent groups has made this a 
possibility. The Islamic extremist groups largely marginalized the MNLA as early as 
June 2012. The marriage of convenience between the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO 
to fight the government forces was never very strong to begin with, as the MNLA sought 
autonomy, not the imposition of Islamic law like the other groups. The Tuareg separatists 
were estimated to have lost all of their significant bases to the Islamists in northern Mali 
by July, and were thereafter in survival mode, looking for an opportunity to strike back.95  
The MNLA’s latest attempt to re-establish a foothold in the region reportedly failed when 
they attempted to attack and secure the northern city of Gao in mid-November. Held by 
MUJAO, the city was allegedly reinforced by several hundred AQIM fighters prior to the 
MNLA assault.96 
The central government in Bamako must capitalize on the MNLA’s current 
situation, enlisting their assistance in securing northern Mali with force. The separatist 
rebels have shown that they are willing to fight the extremists, and along with the Tuareg 
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Islamic-affiliated group Ansar Dine have indicated that they are willing to discuss a 
relationship with the Malian government. In line with the findings of this thesis, the 
government must make it clear that they will accept the assistance of the Tuareg rebels in 
expelling the Islamist extremist threats from AQIM and MUJAO, but will not conduct 
negotiations on the future of northern Mali until the objectives of the military actions are 
complete. Any further violence from the Tuareg rebels will be met with violence. Both 
ECOWAS and the Malian government have made moves towards this possibility, with 
Bamako naming four representatives to establish dialogue with the rebels and explore the 
possibility of an alliance.97               
The government of Mali must make it clear to the Tuareg rebels that they have to 
unconditionally support the establishment of security throughout the countries 
boundaries. Security is vital to the improvement of their own welfare. If a combined 
effort between international coalition forces, the Malian army, and the Tuareg rid 
northern Mali of the threat of AQIM-related violence, kidnappings, and other crime, 
tourism could return (if there are any locations for tourists to return to that have not been 
destroyed by Islamic extremists), providing much needed revenue to the local population. 
NGOs that once sustained the local level governments would be free to return as well. 
Regionally, if bodies like ECOWAS with the aid of northern African countries like 
Algeria actively engaged the threats that span international borders, like drug, weapons, 
and human trafficking, extremist groups would no longer have a safe haven in the 
ungoverned spaces like northern Mali. This is a monumental task that deserves further 
study, and is out of the scope of this thesis. Overall, though, security must be established 
through a regional counterinsurgency effort, and any efforts at reconciliation without 
security will likely lead to conflict recurrence. 
This leads to several implications for U.S. policy, most of which are already being 
implemented by the U.S. government. Washington has acknowledged that military force 
will be necessary to root out the threats to regional security starting with northern Mali. 
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The U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, has stated publically that 
a regional military solution is required, including the participation of Algeria and 
Mauritania, to achieve the desired security end state. However, the U.S. insists that a 
democratic government be firmly in place in Bamako prior to the initiation of combat 
operations. Carson stated in October that “it is absolutely, critically important for there to 
be democratic progress in Mali, that there be a restoration of the civilian, democratic, 
constitutional government, and that needs to be done as soon as possible.”98  Beyond a 
return to the democratic foundations that Mali was once known for before the March 
2012 coup, the U.S. insists on a carefully planned operation with clearly stated goals 
prior to any offensive operations. As mentioned earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton met with Algerian government officials in October in an effort to gain more 
support in the military efforts, leading to a shift in Algiers position from anti-intervention 
to at least acquiescence.99 
While not necessarily affecting the military counterinsurgency strategy required 
to secure northern Mali, U.S. policy also rules out direct American participation in 
ground combat operations. With the distrust of foreign powers exhibited by the Malian 
population, this is probably a wise decision. Any support from the U.S. will likely come 
in the form of financial backing like the recent support to African Union (AU) operations 
in Somalia. The U.S. has spent at least $550 million on that mission since 2007, aiding 
approximately 18,000 African peacemakers.100  This, of course, is contingent upon Mali 
returning a free and fairly elected democratic state, without the influence of the March 
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coup leaders. In April, the military officers installed former speaker of parliament 
Dioncounda Traoré as interim president for one year, charged with overseeing the return 
of governance to civilian control. The status of this transition back to civilian rule is 
unknown; however, ECOWAS lifted sanctions following Traoré’s assumption of the 
presidency. U.S. military aid is still suspended as of November 2012. If and when it is 
lifted, U.S. policy should focus on the intent of the TSCTP. This includes efforts to 
strengthen regional counterterrorism forces (and the coordination between these forces) 
as well as assistance by the Department of State and USAID to strengthen governmental 
capacity. Institutional reform must be included in this program to build a reliable, self-
sustaining military force capable of securing the entire country from threats to security, 
meeting and defeating those threats prior to any kind of negotiations with insurgents.101         
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